ABSTRACT: Kroedel has proposed a new solution, the permissibility solution, to the lottery paradox. The lottery paradox results from the Lockean thesis according to which one ought to believe a proposition just in case one's degree of belief in it is sufficiently high. The permissibility solution replaces the Lockean thesis by the permissibility thesis according to which one is permitted to believe a proposition if one's degree of belief in it is sufficiently high. This note shows that the epistemology of belief that results from the permissibility thesis and the epistemology of degrees of belief is empty in the sense that one need not believe anything, even if one's degrees of belief are maximally bold. Since this result can also be achieved by simply dropping the Lockean thesis, or by replacing it with principles that are logically stronger than the permissibility thesis, the question arises what the permissibility solution is a solution of.
epistemology of belief that results from the permissibility thesis and the epistemology of degrees of belief is empty in the sense that one need not believe anything, even if one's degrees of belief are maximally bold. Since this result can also be achieved by simply dropping the Lockean thesis, or by replacing it with principles that are logically stronger than the permissibility thesis, the question arises what the permissibility solution is a solution of.
In order to discuss Kroedel's proposal 4 it will prove useful to formalize the Lockean thesis in various flavors. For the sake of simplicity let us assume that there is a context-independent threshold c that specifies just how high sufficiently high is. Let us also assume that the threshold c is the same for all propositions under consideration.
Let a be the ideal doxastic agent, and B a her belief relation, and Pr a her degree of belief function. O (·) is the operator for obligation, and O (· | ·) is the operator for conditional obligation. The permissibility operators can be introduced as the duals of the obligation operators: P(·) = ¬O(¬·) and P(· | ·) = ¬O(¬· | ·). ↔ is the material biconditional. Locke 1 is logically stronger than Locke 2 which in turn is logically stronger than Locke 3. Locke 1 is logically stronger than Locke 4, whatever the exact nature of X and Y. We will see that Locke 4 is the best formalization of the Lockean thesis, as the lottery paradox does not arise for Locke 2 or Locke 3.
X and Y are -admissible‖ propositions. What counts as admissible will depend on the underlying deontic logic, among others (see the appendix). For present purposes X can be assumed to be information about Pr a and B a that is consistent with Pr (A) > c and does not conflict with any of the norms mentioned The Lockean thesis is of philosophical interest, because it allows us to derive the epistemology of belief from the epistemology of degrees of belief. (Strictly speaking it is the doxastology of belief and of degrees of belief, but I will follow standard usage.) Unfortunately the Lockean thesis results in paradox. It violates our expectations on the epistemology of belief once we start to fill in the details of our epistemology of degrees of belief. The latter will include the following, among others. For all real numbers x and y, and for all propositions A and C (in some algebra of propositions) over some non-empty set of possible worlds W that are jointly inconsistent in the sense that A ∩ C = ∅: This formalization is incomplete, as there are many further conditional obligations. It may also seem somewhat unorthodox. However, this formalization is logically weaker, even once completed, than the standard formulation of the probability calculus without the operators for obligation and conditional obligation. It is so in the exact same way that Locke 4 is logically weaker than Locke 1. I assume O (·) to be equivalent to O (· | T) for the trivial or tautological (action) sentence T. Only action sentences will be allowed in the first argument place. While I have not done so, the reader should also feel free to replace ‗O' by ‗O a ', as these norms are directed at our ideal doxastic agent a, and justified by being the means to attaining her doxastic goals.
5 Given (a complete version of) the norms 1-3 it makes sense to additionally assume that c is a real number not smaller than 1/2, but smaller than 1.
When we add the Lockean thesis to our epistemology of degrees of belief we get an epistemology of belief. For instance, from Locke 4 and (a complete With Kroedel 6 we will supplement Locke 4 with Littlejohn's Low, 7 except that we formalize it as a conditional obligation:
where X is assumed to be information about Pr a and B a that is consistent with Pr (A) < 1−c and does not conflict with any of the norms mentioned above. Given Low we can derive that the ideal doxastic agent is not permitted to believe the contradictory proposition ∅, and that she is not permitted to believe the negation of any belief of hers. That is, for appropriate choices of X and Y,
We expect these consequences to be part of epistemology of belief. Unfortunately there are other norms we expect to be part of our epistemology of belief that we cannot derive. Indeed, there are norms we expect to be part of our epistemology of belief that are precluded by Locke 4 in the presence of Low and (a complete version of) 1-3. The lottery paradox shows the following one to be an example.
Conj For all propositions A and C, O(B a (A∩C) | B a (A) ∧ B a (C) ∧ Y).
(Y is again appropriately chosen information about B a and Pr a that is consistent with B a (A) ∧ B a (C) and does not conflict with any of the norms mentioned above.
I will assume this to be the case for the remainder of this note without explicitly mentioning it any longer.) The reason is that adding Conj to Locke 4 and Low and (a complete version of) 1-3 results in a conflict of norms for many seemingly reasonable distributions Pr of the ideal doxastic agent's degrees of belief. However, the following consequence of Low and (a complete version of) 1-3
implies the negation of Lottery:
In other words, in the presence of seemingly minimal theses about degrees of belief and about belief, Locke 4 implies a contradiction.
The lottery paradox also arises if we formulate the Lockean thesis as Locke 1. Interestingly, though, the lottery paradox does not arise if we formulate the Lockean thesis as Locke 2 or Locke 3, even if 1-3 are strengthened to the standard formulation of the probability calculus and Conj is analogously strengthened as follows (⊃ is the material conditional):
For all propositions A and C, B a (A) ∧ B a (C) ⊃ B a (A ∩ C).
What is paradoxical about the lottery paradox is that the epistemology of belief that we get from Locke 4 and Low and (a complete version of) 1-3 does not meet our expectations. In order to resolve the inconsistency at least one of the above mentioned principles has to be given up. Different philosophers have made different recommendations. It replaces the Lockean thesis by the thesis that the ideal doxastic agent ought to believe a proposition just in case this proposition is implied by, i.e. a (not necessarily proper) superset of, the set of most plausible possible worlds. According to Lin and Kelly 14 the ideal doxastic agent considers a possible world to be more plausible than another possible world if, and only if, her degree of belief in the former is sufficiently higher than her degree of belief in the latter. The most plausible worlds are those for which there is none that is more plausible. Both the stability solution and the sufficiency solution derive an epistemology of belief from the epistemology of degrees of belief that meets our expectations as they are formulated in Taut Adding High 5 instead of Locke 4 to Low and (a complete version of) 1-3 avoids the inconsistency. It does not solve the lottery paradox, though. Our expectations as formulated in Taut, for instance, are not met, as the permissibility solution does not deliver an epistemology of belief according to which an ideal doxastic agent ought to believe the tautological proposition. While Low implies that our ideal doxastic agent is not permitted to believe the contradictory proposition, she is not required to believe the tautological -or, for that matter, any -proposition if we add High 5 to Low and (a complete version of) 1-3.
Nor are our expectations as formulated in Closure met, as the permissibility solution does not deliver an epistemology of belief according to which an ideal doxastic agent ought to believe every logical consequence of all her beliefs. The ideal doxastic agent need not even believe a single logical consequence of any of her beliefs. Nor need she obey Conj and believe the conjunction of any two propositions she believes.
Indeed, suppose our ideal doxastic agent has one of the boldest Jamesian degree of belief functions, one that assigns to each proposition the maximal degree of belief or else the minimal degree of belief. 24 It is compatible with this and High 5 and Low and (a complete version of) 1-3 (even in their logically stronger formulations) that the ideal doxastic agent's belief relation is the most cautious of all Cliffordian belief relations, the one that suspends judgment with respect to all propositions. 25 In other words, the epistemology of belief that results from the epistemology of degrees of belief on the permissibility solution is, in this precise sense, empty. we develop two parallel epistemologies, viz. the epistemology of belief and the epistemology of degrees of belief. Indeed, this much is true even if we adopt High 3 or High 2, both of which are logically stronger than High 5. However, replacing the Lockean thesis by High 5 does not solve the paradox, as our expectations on the epistemology of belief remain not being met. While the Lockean thesis may not give us the epistemology of belief we have expected, it at least gives us an epistemology of belief. The permissibility solution does not give us an epistemology of belief that we did not expect. But that is only because, much like the recommendation by Jeffrey, 29 it does not give us an epistemology of belief at all.
Postscriptum on conditional obligations
According to the logic of conditional obligations, the following rule of inference preserves the designated value (is truth-preserving, if one thinks that conditional norms have truth values), and hence preserves deontic validity: 
